H.A.S. Johnston.
The Fulani Empire of Sokoto

London. Ibadan. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. 1967. 312 p.

Previous Home Next

Chapter Six
The Jihad in Katsina, Kano, and Zazzau


Katsina, it will be remembered, was one of the original Hausa States and had always been in the first flight. Its capital, with walls nearly eight miles in circumference, was an important centre in the trades of both the Sahara and the Sudan and its people were renowned throughout Hausaland for their learning.
In earlier times Katsina's main rival had been Kano and wars between them had been frequent. But in the eighteenth century the Gobirawa, after their move from Air, had become the principal enemy. As a result, after Gobir had defeated Zamfara and occupied half its territory, Katsina had supported the Zamfara diehards and kept their resistance alive, particularly in the town of Kiyawa. This had led to intermittent but long-drawn-out hostilities which had weakened both sides and which had not come to an end until the Katsinawa had defeated and killed Sarkin Gobir Yakuba in 1801.
Katsina is good country for cattle and at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were undoubtedly plenty of Fulani among its people. There is no record of Shehu having made any of his tours there, but he must at least have traversed the State when he visited Daura and he was certainly well known to the local Moslems, because some of them had been his pupils.
When the jihad began, the Hausas of Katsina were probably not sorry to see the Gobirawa in difficulties. Certainly, although an appeal was made to them, they sent no help to Yunfa before the battle of Tabkin Kwatto. After the battle, however, they seem to have been quick to perceive that Shehu constituted a new force which might threaten them as well as Gobir. Yunfa pointed the moral in a letter which he wrote at this time to all his brother Chiefs. There had been a small fire in Gobir, he wrote, and because he had neglected to stamp it out, it had flared up and burnt him. Let them be warned by his experience 1.
Yunfa's letter probably reached the Chief of Katsina before the conciliatory message which Shehu sent at about the same time. At any rate, when Shehu's letter was brought to him he did not hesitate, as did the Chiefs of Kano and Zazzau, but simply tore it up.
— Even so, Bello wrote afterwards, did God tear up his kingdom and his power 2.
In Katsina, as in other Hausa States, Yunfa's message gave the signal for the outlawing of the reformers and the Fulani to begin.
— When Sarkin Katsina heard what had happened to Sarkin Gobir he commanded his Chiefs to make war upon all who were allied to Shehu. Then the Katsina Chiefs combined to kill and capture them until our people came into the open and banded themselves together in large bodies and set to work to arm themselves 3.
Two such bodies fought their way westward in the late rains of 1804 and reached Shehu when he was making his way to southern Zamfara. They were the first important reinforcements to reach him, and must have been doubly welcome 4.
Meanwhile their comrades who had remained behind in Katsina and Daura had alarmed the Hausa Chiefs sufficiently to cause them to try to join forces with the Chief of Kano, with the object of crushing the Fulani risings. Contingents led by Sarkin Katsina and Sarkin Daura actually set out for Kano, but found their way barred by strong Fulani forces under Dan Tunku, the future Emir of Kazaure, who defeated them and compelled them to turn back 5.
Among Shehu's personal followers was a Fulani called Umaru Dallaji. He seems to have fought at Tabkin Kwatto and the other early battles of the jihad, but after the subjugation of Kebbi and the defection of Zamfara, that is to say in the middle of 1805, he was sent to take charge of operations in his native Katsina. His arrival fortunately coincided with the defeat of the Hausas by Dan Tunku. He was therefore able to take the offensive straight away and capture many towns in the southern part of the State.
One of the places which did not fall to Umaru Dallaji was Yandoto, a town which had long been celebrated as a seat of learning 6. Its Mallams had never accepted Shehu's teaching and since the start of the jihad they had been maintaining that he was in error and guilty of deceiving and misleading the people 7. In a war that was being fought on issues of religious principle such a centre of opposition was of course more dangerous than a hostile army. For the reformers it was therefore imperative that this strident voice of dissent should either be won over or else stifled. And so towards the end of 1805, as soon as Kebbi had been subdued again after the rising that followed the battle of Alwasa, Bello was dispatched to Katsina Laka, the southern part of the State, to deal with Yandoto and to reinforce and direct Umaru Dallaji's operations 8.
With him Bello took Muhammadu Ashafa, a Fulani from this part of Katsina 9 who had himself studied in Yandoto, but who had been expelled when he had declared for Shehu. When Bello arrived before the town he sent Muhammadu to the people with a message saying that he had not come with the intention of making war on them but in the hope of settling all differences by discussion. They spurned this overture, however, and refused either to see Bello or to listen to what he had to say. This rebuff proved too much for Bello's patience and so, without further ado, he moved up his forces and took the town 10.
After this, still accompanied by Umaru Dallaji and Muhammadu Ashafa and now with the support of another influential Fulani called Muhammadu dan Alhaji, Bello went on to exploit his success. He captured many other Hausa towns and subdued a group of local Fulani who had been assisting the Hausa régime 11.
When southern Katsina (which at this time also included the Chafe-Gusau-Kanoma area) had been secured, Bello decided that the time had come for him to return to Shehu. He therefore presented flags to Umaru Dallaji and Muhammadu dan Alhaji, as symbols of their authority, and ordered them to move north, into the centre of the State, and attack Awai and Ranko 12 while Muhammadu Ashafa remained in Katsina Laka to consolidate the territory that had already been won 13.
Ranko and Awai soon fell. The Hausas, under the Ubandawaki, launched a counter-attack against Ranko, but this was repulsed and they were compelled to fall back on the capital 14. The way was now open for the decisive blow.
But before any attempt was made to deliver it, another powerful ally was recruited to Shehu's cause, namely Umaru Dumyawa, the Chief of the Sullubawa in Katsina. The Sullubawa, like the Toronkawa, were not pure Fulani but part Fulani and part Mandingo. They had come with the Fulani from Senegal, however, and they shared their outlook and way of life. Those settled in Gobir and Kebbi had already thrown in their lot with Shehu and now Umaru Dumyawa also took up arms. As his people were settled in the north of the State, which was still in the hands of the Hausas, his accession to the cause was of particular importance. He too was therefore rewarded with a flag 15.
In the dry season of 1806-7, while Muhammadu Ashafa held the south and Umaru Dumyawa the north, Umaru Dallaji and Muhammadu dan Alhaji closed in on the capital 16. The siege was a long one and food became so short in the city that a lizard fetched 50 cowries and a vulture 500 17. At one point the Chief sued for terms but his overtures were referred to Bello who, suspecting treachery, rejected them 18.
Soon afterwards Muhammadu dan Alhaji died. Umaru Dallaji intensified the pressure, however, and at last forced the Hausas to come out and fight in the open. In the ensuing battle the Fulani were completely victorious, the Hausa Chief being killed and his army forced to yield up the city and fall back on Dankama in the north 19.
The capture of Katsina was a major success, but in neighbouring Gobir and Zamfara the war was far from over. Soon afterwards, therefore, Umaru Dallaji went off to help Namoda, the leader of the Zamfara Fulani, in the task of containing Alkalawa. It was probably during his absence that the Katsina Hausas, under their new Chief, Magajin Halidu, launched a surprise counter-attack and recaptured the City 20.
The Hausas, however, lacked the strength to exploit this unexpected success, or even to hold Katsina, and they fell back to Dankama. There, soon afterwards, they were attacked by Umaru Dallaji, who had come hurrying back from Alkalawa accompanied by the Zamfara Fulani under Namoda, and by a contingent sent up from Kano 21. This combined force defeated the Hausas and took the town. Among those who were killed was the new Chief, who either fell in the fighting or, as some say, committed suicide by jumping down a well 22.
After the victory at Dankama Shehu recognized Umaru Dallaji as the first Fulani Emir 23 of Katsina. There remained, however, the problem of how to find suitable fiefs for the families of the other two flag-holders. It was solved by a compromise which, if it did not satisfy everyone, at least kept the peace and prevented the Emirate from being broken up. Alhaji's flag had been inherited by his son, Mamman Dikko. He was now appointed warden of the western marches and given the title of Yandakka. Furthermore, though he was expected to accept the local leadership of the new Emir, he was nevertheless allowed to do homage in Sokoto instead of Katsina and the appointment of his successors was retained in the hands of the Sultans of Sokoto and not delegated to the Emirs of Katsina. The other flag-bearer, Umaru Dumyawa, who was still alive, was given the title of Sarkin Sullubawa and accorded similar privileges 24. This solution had the effect of circumscribing the power of the Emirs of Katsina and consequently their rule never became as autocratic as those of some of the other Emirs.
The early victory in Katsina played an important part in the jihad and particularly in the decisive struggle against Gobir. First of all it convinced waverers everywhere that Shehu's supporters were really capable of winning the war. Secondly, as already described, it isolated Gobir from the other Hausa States and cut off any prospect of help coming from them or from Bornu. Thirdly, it helped Namoda to complete the pacification of eastern Zamfara. Finally, it released important forces with the result that both the Katsina contingent under Umaru Dallaji and the Zamfara contingent under Namoda were able to take part in the final siege and storming of Alkalawa.
On the Hausa side the great mass of the peasantry had probably taken little part in the war and they now accepted the new régime without protest. For the ruling classes, however, it was a different story. It was they, with their slaves and feudal levies, who had persecuted the reformers and then taken the field against them. During the war they had first been driven back into the city and then forced to flee the country altogether. As soon as they had gone, the victors, who were mainly Fulani, were free to take possession of their houses and step into the public offices which they had occupied. This process went on all over the Emirate, in the villages and hamlets as well as the towns, and it explains why the seizure of power was so thorough and far-reaching.
As for the Hausa diehards, though defeated and driven into exile, they were by no means finished. After the death of Magajin Halidu they appointed Dan Kasuwa to be their Chief 25. Under him they had at first to fall back on the neighbouring State of Damagaram, but they rallied later and established themselves round Maradi in what had previously been the northern corner of their kingdom. This foothold they managed to retain for the rest of the century and when they had recovered some of their former strength they became, as we shall see, a most painful thorn in the side of the Fulani.


Kano had always been the richest and most populous of the Hausa States and at the end of the eighteenth century its capital was probably the greatest city in the whole Sudan. In a political and military sense, however, it was not as strong as it appeared to be. Its people, perhaps even more than most Hausas, were absorbed in their own pursuits, particularly their very extensive trade, and had little time or zeal to spare for other things. Even The Kano Chronicle, which clearly glosses over much that was discreditable or unflattering, cannot altogether conceal the fact that their record in war was a poor one.
The country, like neighbouring Katsina, was well suited to cattle and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Fulani had penetrated the State in some strength. Most of them indeed had been established for so many generations that they no longer thought of themselves as members of the clans to which they had originally belonged but on the contrary, as their nomenclature shows, had formed new groups based on the territories in which they had become settled or semi-settled.
In the city the most important group of Fulani were the Mundubawa. To the north-west there were the Yolawa, to the north the Dambazawa, to the south-east the Danejawa 26. In addition there were the Sullubawa whom we have already encountered in Katsina, people of mixed Fulani and Mandingo origin but otherwise almost indistinguishable from the Fulani proper. In Kano their main strength lay to the west of the city 27.
The Kano Fulani were in touch with Shehu long before his breach with Yunfa. In fact, at least three prominent members of their leading families were studying under him at the time of his flight to Gudu.
Soon afterwards they were sent back to Kano with orders to rally the faithful.
When Shehu's conciliatory letter, written after his victory at Tabkin Kwatto, was first brought to Alwali, the Chief of Kano, he was apparently on the point of accepting it but something caused him to change his mind 28. We do not know what this was but it may either have been Yunfa's warning message or else the news that the Fulani, led by Dan Tunku, had already taken up arms and defeated the attempt of the Chiefs of Katsina and Daura to join their forces to his. Whatever the reason, Alwali rejected Shehu's overtures and the war therefore spread to Kano.
After his early success, Dan Tunku, went north to Daura, where he helped the Fulani to seize power 29 and he seems to have taken no further part in the jihad in Kano. This was dominated by seven men drawn from the six territorial groups which have already been mentioned:

Under these leaders the Fulani formed a war camp in the bush at a place called Kwazazzabo `Yar Kwando about thirty miles west of the city. There they recruited their strength until they were ready to strike 30.
Their first move, which was probably made in the dry weather of 1804-5, was to assault the neighbouring town of Karaye. This was the headquarters of the Wambai, one of the territorial magnates of the Hausa hierarchy, and their object may well have been to forestall an attack by him on their own unfortified camp. Whatever the purpose, the assault was completely successful and Karaye, though defended by a wall, was captured 31.
Hitherto Alwali seems to have underrated the danger which the Fulani represented, but the loss of Karaye stung him into action. He collected an army and led it against the Fulani at 'Yar Kwando. According to legend, the battle lasted two days and, but for a ruse, might have gone against the Fulani. As it was, they won a heartening victory 32.
The major battle of the jihad in Kano was fought at Dan Yahaya, about twenty-five miles north of the city, and probably took place in the dry season of 1806-7. Sarkin Kano Alwali is said to have put ten thousand horsemen into the field as well as thousands of infantry. Although this figure may well be an exaggeration there is no doubt that the Hausas enjoyed a great preponderance in numbers. Once again, however, the skill and resolution of the Fulani bowmen turned the tide of war. They won a crushing victory and forced Alwali and the remnants of his army to fall back on the city 33.
The withdrawal of the Hausa forces behind the walls of the capital left the Fulani a free hand in the country. They put it to good use and soon eliminated, or at any rate isolated, all pockets of resistance. Having obtained control of the greater part of the State, they at length turned their attention to the city. Kano was finally captured in 1807, probably in the last quarter, that is to say about a year later than Katsina, but a year earlier than Alkalawa 34.
After losing his capital Alwali fled to Burumburum, a large walled town in the extreme south of his former domains. Had he been allowed to establish himself there, he would doubtless have become the focus of a Hausa resistance movement which might have plagued the new régime for the rest of the century. As it was, a Fulani force led by Mallam Jammo of the Sullubawa Clan pursued him and, after a siege of forty days, stormed the town. Alwali was killed and with his death a dynasty of forty-three Chiefs came to an end 35. Hausa resistance in Kano was thus extinguished.
The choice of the first Fulani Emir and the division of the spoils of victory among the other leaders was to cause some dissension. Two years earlier Shehu had summoned them all to meet him in Zamfara so that he could appoint a leader, but in the event he had been unable to make the journey. Bello had therefore represented him at this meeting, which had taken place just before the attack on Yandoto, and acting on Shehu's instructions 36 had selected Sulimanu to take command. The choice was not a happy one because Sulimanu was an unworldly scholar and evidently lacked the personality that leadership demanded 37.
So long as the enemy was in the field, the reformers had suppressed their rivalries and remained loyal to their appointed leader. As soon as victory was won, however, their differences broke out. When Abdullahi went to Kano towards the end of 1807, soon after the capture of the city, he found the Fulani preoccupied with their worldly rivalries, and at odds with one another 38. He had some success in settling their disputes, but with his departure they seem to have broken out afresh.
At any rate, in 1808 it was considered necessary to send a deputation to Shehu in Gwandu in order to get the question of the leadership decided. Reading between the lines, one cannot escape the conclusion that the purpose of this move was to have Sulimanu deposed and one of the other leaders appointed Emir in his place. If this was the case, however, the attempt failed because Shehu confirmed Bello's earlier choice and invested the unsophisticated and relatively youthful Sulimanu with the insignia of an Emir 39. To consolidate his authority still further he also gave him a daughter in marriage.
Despite these marks of favour Sulimanu never succeeded in quelling the rivalries that surrounded him or establishing himself firmly on the throne of Kano. In fact, within a year he had a serious quarrel with one of his lieutenants, Muhammadu Dabo, which again required Shehu's intervention 40.
The persistence of these jealousies helps to explain why in 1809 the Kano Fulani, unlike their cousins in Katsina and Zamfara, sent no reinforcements to Shehu for the final battle at Alkalawa. The truth is that because of Sulimanu's weakness as a ruler the hold which they had established on Kano, was at first a precarious one. This was revealed by the widespread Hausa revolts which broke out when Sulimanu died in 1819.
In most of the Fulani Emirates when the first ruler died the succession passed to his descendants. That events in Kano took a different course can be attributed to two factors, first, the near-equality of the seven families which had led the jihad and, second, the ineffectiveness of Sulimanu as a ruler. When he died the question of who should succeed him was referred to Sokoto. By that time Shehu too was dead and Bello had become Sultan. His choice fell on Ibrahim Dabo, the head of the Sullubawa, who was duly appointed to be the second Emir and who founded the dynasty which was to rule Kano for the rest of the century 41.
Zazzau was the most southerly of the original Hausa States. Between it and the River Benue lay a belt of country which differed from the open plains of the north by being more hilly and having a denser cover of bush. This area contained no important States, apart from Nupe in the south-west, and its population was grouped into a number of petty principalities and independent pagan tribes. In the seventeenth century they were all embodied into the riverain empire of Kwararafa, while Zazzau itself was threatened and constricted, but as the Jukun power receded again, so a power-vacuum was created into which Zazzau was able to expand.
In the north the expansion of the Hausa States had already taken the form of settlement; plantation, or conquest followed by assimilation. In the south, however, the denser bush did not appeal to Hausa settlers and the more primitive tribes were not easy to assimilate. Consequently, Zazzau's expansion proceeded by conquest and the imposition of suzerainty, not by settlement or assimilation, and the pattern which emerged from it differed from the conventional one. By the end of the eighteenth century there were, in fact, five petty Chiefs on Zazzau's southern borders who ruled over congeries of Gwaris, Bassas, and other small tribes and tribal fragments. All these Chiefs owed allegiance to Zazzau and were subject to loose control by the Hausa Chief. Provided that they paid their tribute of slaves, however, they were largely left to their own devices 42.
In addition to these vassals, there were other tribes which had never made submission. Having refused to purchase their immunity by doing homage and paying tribute, they were regarded by the Hausas as fair game for the slave raids by which Zazzau traditionally supported itself and provided for the needs of the rest of Hausaland 43.
In 1802 Muhamman Makau succeeded as the sixtieth Chief of Zazzau 44. He was a devout Moslem and when, after the jihad had begun, Shehu's message was brought to him, he was ready to accept it. His advisers thought otherwise, however, and he was compelled to defer to their views 45. As Zazzau had apparently not followed Gobir and Katsina in renouncing its allegiance to Bornu, and as the suzerain's influence seems to have been stronger there than in the other Hausa States 46, it may well be that Makau was coerced in this matter by the Kachalla, the Sultan of Bornu's Resident at his Court, or perhaps by an alliance between the Kachalla and his own Councillors, Whatever the process might have been, the outcome was that Shehu's overtures were rejected and the war spread.
The principal leader of the jihad in Zazzau was a Fulani called Mallam Musa who hailed originally from Mali, in the western Sudan, He had come to Hausaland some time before and, after studying under Shehu, had established himself in Zazzau as a religious teacher. He is said to have taken part in the flight from Degel to Gudu and he certainly received a flag from Shehu with a commission to lead the jihad in Zazzau 47.
The Fulani had been established for generations in Zazzau, as in the other Hausa States, and Musa's appointment as leader seems to have caused some jealousy among the older families. Prominent among these were another branch of the Sullubawa, whom we have already met in Katsina and Kano, and the Bornawa who, as their name shows, were Fulani who had come to Zazzau by way of Bornu. Musa was instructed by Shehu to work with their leaders, Abdu Salami and Yamusa, and this he did 48.
In the month of March, probably in the year 1805, Musa entered Zazzau from the north 49. No doubt he had previously arranged a rendezvous there with Shehu's known adherents. In addition he received support from some of the local Hausas 50.
As soon as he heard of the invasion, Malum sent his cavalry, under the Madaki, to intercept the enemy and bar their way to the city.
Musa either defeated this force or else gave it the slip, for very soon afterwards he was able to take the Hausas completely by surprise. It happened to be the day of the Lesser Bairam, festival and the Chief, attended by his followers and accompanied by all the Moslems of the city, had ridden forth as usual to the ceremonial prayer-ground outside the walls. While there, they were surprised by Musa's cavalry and their retreat into the city cut off. Being unarmed they were unable to stand and fight and so they had no choice but to fly. The great city of Zaria, therefore, fell to the Fulani with hardly a blow having been struck 51.
Having lost his capital Makau made his way south with about three thousand followers. He went first to Kauru, but the Chief, who was one of his vassals, shut the gates of the town against him. He therefore passed on to Kajuru where the Chief admitted him. The Fulani were close on his heels, however, and besieged him there for six months. In the end their pressure became so great that he was forced to move on again 52
From Kajuru, Makau went on to Zuba. The Fulani continued to attack and harry him for the next fifteen months, but in the south the terrain was more hilly and less open than in the north and they failed to kill or capture him. Finally, in 1807, he repulsed them whereupon they abandoned the pursuit and went back to Zaria 53.
When he became a fugitive, Makau found that some of his subjects, notably the Gwari, remained loyal to him but that most of them threw off their allegiance. Having no capital or base of his own, he was forced to keep moving about in the broken country which lies between the Niger and the Benue Rivers near their confluence. In this way he preserved a precarious existence for another eighteen years, In 1825, however, while attacking the town of Lapai, he met his death 54.
Makau was succeeded by his brother, Abu Ja. It was he who founded the town of Abuja and this became the headquarters of the fugitive Hausas of Zazzau 55. They continued to maintain their independence and, by exerting their influence over the neighbouring pagan tribes, gradually built Abuja into a Chiefdom of some importance. For the rest of the century they were to remain a thorn in the side of the Fulani, but they never developed into such a serious menace as the diehards of Gobir, Katsina, and Kebbi were soon to become.
Meanwhile, Mallam Musa had been confirmed by Shehu as the first Fulani Emir. His first task was to consolidate his authority in Zazzau proper and its vassal States. After the flight of Makau there seems to have been little resistance from the Hausas 56. The feudatories and major office holders fled or stepped down into obscurity. Either way, the road was left open for the new Emir to install his own supporters, the great majority of whom were Fulani.
Musa was not content with consolidation, however, and was determined to extend his dominions southward. This he did by inducing the Fulani in the area, who were already fighting the local pagan tribes, to accept his leadership. The Fulani of Jema'a seem to have been glad enough to do so in return for Musa's promise of protection and support 57. Those of Keffi, where Abdu Zanga had already established a town protected by a stockade, were at first hopeful of obtaining recognition direct from Shehu, but Musa persuaded them that Shehu had already made him suzerain of all the territory between Zaria and the Benue River. In the end, therefore, they were content to accept a flag from him and acknowledge him as their overlord 58. In this way the two small Emirates of Jema'a and Keffi came into being in about 1810 as vassals of Zazzau. Nearly a generation later the process was repeated when Makama Dogo, a Hausa soldier of fortune who had carved out a kingdom for himself in the south, was recognized as the vassal Emir of Nassarawa 59. In this way Zaria, as the Emirate of the Fulani now came to be called, at length reached the Benue.
When Musa, the first Emir, died in 1821 one of his sons expected to succeed him. In the event, however, the choice of the Electors fell on Yamusa, the head of the Bornawa family, who as the Madaki had been Musa's principal lieutenant. Similarly, when Yamusa died in 1834, the throne did not go to any of his sons but to Abdul Kerim, another Fulani who had played a prominent part in the jihad 60. After that, apart from one aberration, the succession rotated irregularly between the houses of these first three Emirs. This meant that Zaria had three ruling families whereas in all the other Emirates, including Kano after the initial change, there was only one dynasty.

1. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 105).
2. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 63).
3. Ibid. p. 66.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. p. 77.
6. Ibid. p. 8.
7. Ibid. p. 87.
8. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, P. 87).
9. Sokoto DNBs, History of Gusau.
10. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 87). The place is deserted now, but the site, still marked by baobab trees, can be seen on the Zaria-Gusau road. See also Note 11 in Appendix I.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. p. 78
13. Sokoto DNBs, History of Gusau.
14. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 78).
15. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, up. cit. p. 168.
16. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 78).
17. Daniel, op. cit. p. 16.
18. Bello, Inf M (Arnett p. 78).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid. pp. 78-79.
22. Daniel, op. cit. p. 16.
23. To mark their greater devotion to Islam, the title ‘Emir’ has been reserved in this book for the Fulani rulers while their Hausa predecessors, though nominally Moslem, have been described as ‘Chiefs’.
24. Daniel, op. cit. pp. 16-17.
25. M. Abadie, La Colonie du Niger, Paris, 1927, pp. 124 and 380.
26. Alhaji Abubakar, Kano to Dabo Cigari, Kano, 1959, pp. 48-49.
27. Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 11.
28. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 63).
29. Ibid. p. 79.
30. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 49, and Kano DNBs, History of Kiru.
31. Kano, DNBs, History of Karaye.
32. Kano DNBs, History of Kano.
33. Gazetteer of Kano Province, p. 11, and Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 79).
34. Kano had certainly, but apparently only recently, been taken when Abdullahi reached it in October or November 1807. See Note to in Appendix 1.
35. Kano DNBs, History of Tudun Wada. The visitor to Burumburum is still shown the baobab tree under which Alwali lies buried.
36. Information from Alhaji Junaidu.
37. H. A. S. Johnston, A Selection of Hausa Stories, Oxford, 1966, pp. 121-2.
38. Abdullah, TW (Hiskett, p. 121).
39. Alhaji Abubakar, op. cit. p. 49.
40. Kano DNBs, History of Dambarta.
41. Alhaji Abubakar, op cit. pp. 52-53. For Ibrahim Dabo's family tree see Table 4 in Appendix II.
42. Ch A, p. 6.
43. Ibid. p. 4.
44. Ch A, p. 37.
45. Bello, Inf M (Arnett, p. 64). Confirmed by Alhaji Junaidu.
46. Hogben and Kirk-Greene, op. cit. p. 219.
47. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 138.
48. Ibid. pp. 138-9.
49. Ch A, p. 5. The date given there is 1804, but this cannot be right because we know from Bello that it was not until July 1804 that Shehu wrote his letters to the Hausa Chiefs, including Zazzau, and the jihad did not really spread to the other States until his overtures had been rejected.
50. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 139.
51. Ch A, pp. 5-6. This disaster is still commemorated during the Moslem festivals in Abuja by the Emir's bodyguard facing to the west while he turns to the east to pray.
52. Ibid. p. 7.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid. p. 8.
55. Ibid. p. 9.
56. M. G. Smith, op. cit. p. 140.
57. Notes on Nassarawa Province, 1920, p. 13.
58. Ibid. p. 6.
59. Ibid. pp. 16-17.
60. M. G. Smith, op. cit. pp. 150-2.

Previous Home Next